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No way of life can be entirely free from inflicting harm on
others. The Vegan Society characterizes veganism as seeking to exclude all exploitation of animals “as far as is possible
and practicable.” Yet the dietary implications of this precept
are not as straightforward as many assume. In Duty and the
Beast, Andy Lamey confronts arguments for what he calls new
omnivorism – recent arguments that profess to undermine the
moral injunction against eating meat that is so prominent in
the animal protection (animal rights) movement. Instead of rejecting animal protection as such, the new critics claim that in
the pursuit of this objective the consumption of some meat is
permissible or even obligatory.
Very sensibly, Lamey defines the vegan diet in terms of a
commitment to reducing harm to animals rather than as a dogmatic set of dietary prohibitions. To do the contrary, it seems
to me, runs the risk of turning veganism into a cult of purity
instead of a rationally defensible, empirically based means to
a just end. The question that runs through this book is whether
the vegan commitment always requires abstaining from meat.
In the course of his wide-ranging study, Lamey tackles the
issue of death as a harm to animals and delves into “burger
veganism,” the doctrine of double effect, Temple Grandin’s
“humane” slaughter, the cognition of chickens, “logic of the
larder” arguments (that meat-eating benefits animals by bringing them into existence), alleged plant consciousness, and in vitro (lab) meat. I will touch on only some of these matters here.
Lamey considers the harm that death is for persons (self-conscious individuals, who are moral agents and have a conception
of themselves as existing through time) versus the harm it is
for the – hypothetically – merely sentient (who are simply con-
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scious and with the ability to experience pleasure and pain). He
argues for a “time-relative interest” account of the wrongness
of killing. Because they lack the quality of future goods that
persons have in prospect and because psychologically they are
only weakly related to their future selves, the death of a merely
sentient being is not nearly as bad as that of a person. Indeed,
Lamey judges that the harm done by killing a merely sentient
animal is less than that done by killing a late-term human fetus. Still, he maintains, even this lesser harm would seldom be
justifiable in terms of providing food, since people normally
have alternative sources of nourishment.
But are most birds and mammals merely sentient? And can
we impartially judge the value of their lives? Not only do we
have a very imperfect grasp of animal minds in all their variety, but our natural anthropocentric bias makes it very difficult to know whether it is really better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. After examining evidence
about the cognition of chickens, an animal frequently viewed
as particularly dim-witted, Lamey concludes that they possess
a form of primitive self-consciousness that includes some sense
of existing through time. This means they have a fairly strong
interest in not being killed, one that cannot be overridden by
the relatively trivial pleasure humans derive from eating them.
The cornerstone of what Lamey labels “burger veganism” is
an article by Steven L. Davis (2003). Davis quotes Tom Regan
as saying: “Whenever we find ourselves in a situation where
all the options at hand will produce some harm to those who
are innocent, we must choose that option that will result in the
least total sum of harm” – which Regan calls the “minimize
harm principle.” Based on a couple of empirical studies, Davis argues that, because of the large numbers of field animals
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killed in the production of crops, a commitment to this principle may require us to reject abstention from meat in favour of
an omnivorous diet that includes grass-fed herbivores raised in
“pasture-forage” systems. Hence “burger veganism.”
In fact, Davis badly misreads Regan. Although Regan defends the “harm principle” (that we have a direct prima facie
duty not to harm individuals who have an experiential welfare),
he only mentions the “minimize harm principle” in order immediately to reject it (Regan 1983: 302). Interpreted as a calculation of aggregate welfare, it is incompatible with Regan’s
own view, which insists on respecting the rights of individual
subjects-of-a-life. Instead, for situations where we cannot avoid
harming some innocents, Regan formulates the miniride (minimize overriding) and worse-off principles. Even so, it may still
be the case, as Davis contends, that an all-plant diet typically
results in more animal deaths than some particular kind of omnivorous diet does.
As Lamey notes, Gaverick Matheny (2003) has found a large
hole in Davis’s arithmetic. Davis has failed to take into account
that much less land is required to feed a given number of people
on an all-plant diet. When this mistake is rectified, says Matheny, a plant diet is seen to result in significantly fewer animal
deaths. For his part, Lamey finds that Davis has greatly overestimated the number of mice killed directly by harvesters; it
turns out that most mice mortality results from predation by
other animals after crop harvesting. Lamey also notes a faulty
assumption in the calculation underlying Michael Archer’s
(2011) burger-vegan claim about the number of mice poisoned
by farmers during mouse plagues in Australia.
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Lamey makes the point that studies show wide variation in
the effects of harvesting practices on different wild animal species, so that it is difficult to generalize about mortality rates.
For example, some studies show that changes in particular
populations in cultivated areas are the result of migration in
and out of these areas and not the result of higher mortality in
cultivated areas.
As Lamey and Bob Fischer (2018) have stressed, the moral import of empirical evidence about animal deaths in plant
agriculture, difficult as such evidence is to come by, depends
on answers to questions that are largely philosophical. Are we
morally responsible for the death of a mouse killed by an owl
after a harvester has removed the crop from a field? What if the
mouse would not have existed in the first place if not for the
shelter for mice provided by the crop? Is the short life of the
average wild mouse on balance positive or negative in terms of
experiences, and how does that affect our assessment of how
harmful its death is? Should we factor in the benefit to the owl
of feasting on the mouse? Do some animals count more than
others because of their greater cognitive capacities? Do insects
count at all? Do we have an obligation to police the natural
world in order to minimize suffering?
One crucial philosophical issue arises from the fact that
many of the deaths of wild animals in crop production are unintended, even if foreseen. Davis counts these deaths as morally equivalent to the intended deaths of farmed animals. Lamey
devotes a chapter (“The Dinner of Double Effect”) to arguing
for what he calls an animal-friendly version of the doctrine of
double effect. If persuasive, this doctrine further undermines
the burger-vegan position.
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All this does not factor in the human and environmental
costs of animal agriculture, including the spread of disease, the
toll on slaughterhouse workers, water pollution, soil erosion,
deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and climate change. A long
list of zoonotic outbreaks, including pandemics, is linked to
animal agriculture or the exploitation of wildlife.
Most of us have heard the refrain “Plants have feelings too”
used as a provocative response to vegetarians/vegans. If true,
the practical import for a commitment to reducing the harm
we do might be profound. The fact that plants are highly sensitive to their environments and respond to them in remarkably
complex ways has previously led some philosophers to argue
that plants have intrinsic value and merit our moral concern.
For instance, Paul Taylor (1986) ascribes equal worth to all living organisms on the basis that each is a “teleological center of
life” – a unified system of goal-oriented activities – whether or
not it is conscious. But, he says, the fact that animals can suffer and plants cannot means it is less wrong to kill a plant to
satisfy our needs than to kill a sentient animal. By contrast, the
new field of so-called “plant neurobiology” often involves more
radical claims: that plants think, that they display intelligence
and are sentient – e.g., Mancuso and Viola (2015).
Lamey examines the key concepts and the evidence. He concludes that “plant thinkers” have provided no good reason to
believe that plants experience the world subjectively, in a manner that would qualify as sentience in the language of animal
protection. Even the possession of some rudimentary form of
consciousness by plants would not raise them to the same moral
status as sentient animals. Further, any obligation to minimize
harm to plants for their own sakes would tell against raising
animals for meat, given the amount of land cleared for animal
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agriculture and since each farmed animal consumes, injures,
and/or kills many plants.
Lamey does not oppose all meat consumption. The concept
of “meat”, he argues, can properly encompass flesh replacements that are not carved directly from the bodies of animals.
He defends in vitro, or lab, meat against protectionist critics
who contend that the consumption of in vitro meat furthers
the ideology that animals are edible or who contend that such
consumption exhibits an inappropriate attitude of irreverence
toward the bodies of animals.
New omnivorism poses a series of challenges to the animal
protection movement as traditionally understood. While they
may have originated in good faith (e.g., via investigation into
the numbers of field animals killed in crop production or into
the complex responses of plants to their environments), these
challenges can be wielded less scrupulously by others for ideological purposes. As such, new omnivorism presents a task for
animal protectionists on both fronts: to engage seriously with
the serious arguments, in the interest of better understanding,
and to combat the latest apologies for animal exploitation.
It is said that Persian carpets contain intentional flaws to acknowledge that only the works of God can be perfect. Who
knew that the august Cambridge University Press would display so much religious zeal – this book contains a surprising
number of typos. But they do not detract from the insightful
arguments woven by the author. A commitment to the core
idea of veganism raises numerous philosophical, scientific, and
practical issues; Andrew Lamey does a fine job of addressing
many of them.
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